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security markets as represented by the stock exchanges of thelead.
ing countries. The interaction of stock markets appears tobe very
strong. Indeed some economists have even suggested that itis tli'e
chief channel through which influences are transmittedinterna.
tionally. Writers2 occasionally discuss the entirephenomenon of
the international spread of business cycles withinpassages on the
cyclical behavior of stock markets rather than insome other con-
nection. Everyday experience seems to bear out this point,or at
least it puts interaction among stock markets very muchin the
foreground. On different national stock markets theprices of the
same shares are as a rule not at variance, owing to perfect arbitrage.
It is therefore natural to extend the notion of thetransmission of
price changes from the stock markets of one country beyondits
boundaries. There is also fresh in memory thesequence of stock
market collapses beginning in October 1929 in NewYork and
extending over most of the leading markets abroad. Hewhose
memory reaches back farther could easily point to earlier similar
experiences, and if statistical information is used,more such in-
stances seem to emerge. Of course these impressions donot do
justice to what is essentially a very complicated and involved
phenomenon with many different aspects which only investigations
beyond the scope of this study can reveal.
(2) Stock markets are strictly organized markets whereprofes-
sional dealers ('jobbers") as well as the general public, through
the intermediary of brokers, sell and buy old andnew domestic
and foreign securities issued by governments, municipalities,or
private corporations. The securities mayor may not bear fixed
interest. Their prices are for the most part formed under strongly
competitive conditions, so that they have often been taken by
economists as the prototype of the pricing process when establish-
ing the elements of a price theory fora competitive market. Prices
are as a rule not established once each time the market meets, but
successively, depending on the continuous change in conditions;
but there are exceptions to this.
The commodities traded are different from those in other markets,
in that they arc probably toa much higher degree subject to
pectations and their variations. It iseven asserted that the stock
market is the one where expectations and the evaluation of chances
meet their final test. The stock market generally discounts future
events, or in other words anticipates them, and thus does not always
'CE. J. A. Schumpeter, Business Cycles, 1939, Vol.ii,pp. 666-887.
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react at the time when an expected event actually happens,be-
cause it has already anticipated its influence by changing the price
trend appropriately. However it would beunwise to think that
these at any rate rather vaguely described anticipationsare always
in the right direction.3 The technical perfection of the securitymar-
kets does not in the least imply a successful evaluation of the
future.4 The importance this fact has for us lies in the susceptibility
of the market to international influences. Some of thenumerous
stock market disturbances are directly traceable to specific political,
potential influences (rumors, speeches, war threats, etc.), as well
as to actual events.
The next important characteristic of stock markets is that a
major portion of the total volume of new savings of the economy
used to flow to it, in order to be invested in old and new securities.
The percentage of the new savings thus available differs widely
among various countries, depending, among other factors, upon the
popularity of the organization of joint stock companies, which is in-
fluenced greatly by the legal measures in each country, upon the
reinvestment of profits in their own companies, and upon the
changes of habits over time.
If long periods of thne are studiedand this is the case, if we
go back to about 1870the fact becomes importantthat the de-
velopment of the organization of business in the form of joint stock
companies differs much from country to country. These companies
were very popular in some countries,less in others. The gradual
transformation of private firms into joint stock companies does not
always alter the amount of capital invested; itdoes increase the
significance of the stock market only if the newshares are traded
there.5 But there is no doubt that thisparticular form of business
organization has grown wherever it hastaken root.
$ There can be no doubt, on a coinmonsense basis, that the NewYork stock
markets were excessively optimistic in 1929and excessively pessimistic in
1932-1933.
'Cf. A. Cowles 3rd, "Can Stock MarketForecasters Forecast?" Econometrka,
VoL a, 1933, pp. 309-324; and J. F.Barbour, "Cowles Studies on the Dow-
Theory," The Ana1ist Journal, VoL iv, No.4, 1948, pp. 11-20. We mayhere
also mention the following undergraduatetheses submitted to the department
of economics of Princeton University:Anthony T. Spano, The Accuracyof
Stock Market Forecasts, 1947-1952;Richard A. Yaffa, TheEconomic-Psycho-
logical Approach to Business CycleForecasting, both in June 1954.
'It may be recalled that the sharesof the Ford Motor Company oneof the
largest industrial enterprises in theworld, were not quoted on anystock ex-
change prior to 1955! The sharesof the Standard Oil Company(New Jersey)
were introduced onthe New York Stock Exchangeonly in 1920.
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The statistical estimation of the amounts ofthe capitalInvoJvj (especially as a percentage of the total capitalavailable ib ing and industry) would be most important. Littleis known
in the most general way, especially for the earlier
perieds altho some efforts have been made to close the gaps inour inforp.ali
Besides the new capital available forinvestment on thesto exchanges, there is, in the aggregate demand,theamount of old capital which is reinvested after having beenwithdrawn fromotJje forms of investment. Furthermore securitieschange hanthby being exchanged against other ones. Thisprocess too hasan
upon the price trend, if there should be a sufficientcon(nfratjon
on either side of the market. This would be thecase, for exanp
if fixed-interest-bearing securitiesare offered, while thereinve. ment is in stocks with variable dividends,or vice versa. Such
occurrence can be observed statistically byopposite pricemove. ments, but the latter need not imply the formerwhenever itocc'jn An additional factor to be considered is theintervention of credit
in the demand for securities.7 Thereare at least two stages ofthis intervention. First, creditmay influence in many deviousways the
volume of "genuine" savings mentionedabove. This possibilityhas been discussed atsome length in the literature, thoughthere do not exist many quantitative investigations.5Second, creditmay be obtained directly for thepurpose of purchasing stock. This would
comprise the so-called "margin buying"and brokers' loans. Thetwo
are not identical, since for long periodsin many countries credit for
margin buying could be obtained directlyfrom the banks without
the intermediary of stockbrokers. The volume of creditsthus
obtained cannot be statisticallydetermined, although brokers' loans
in the United Statesare known for more recent periods.
Here is a source of instabilitywhich has precededmany crises.
In some countrieson the European continent, itwas normal busi.
Cf. especially C. H. Evans,Jr., Business lncorpoiratlons In the UnitedSte* 1800-I 943, National Bureauof Economic Research, 1948; and B. W. Cold. smith, The Share of Financjgjlintermediaries In National Wealth and Natlorwi Assets, National Bureau ofEconomic Research, Occasional Paper 42, 1954. 'There may ofcourse also he other reasons foran increase of demand, sudi as a reversal of trendaway from hoarding. We need notgo into this, statistics on this subject obviouslyare unavailable. Internal and external gold
movements too would have to beconsidered. 'The great difficultiesin regard to determining the factsare descnbed In the paper, 'StatlsticsRelating to Capital Formation,a Note on Method, b the Committee ofStatistical Experts, League ofNations, Ceneva, 1938; ci. also J. M. Keysies'review article, "The Process ofCapital Formation,Ec0
nomic Journal, September1939,pp. 569-574.
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ness practice for many banks to advance money for stock exchange
speculation, generally on the basis of shares as collateral. This is
another form of speculative activity of banks which was often
as risky for them as the granting of loans to industries for the long-
term that often led to a permanent participation by banks in the
management of corporations.9
In addition to these sources of demand, there are foreign fund.s
to be found on almost all stock exchanges. They are often, if not
generally, of a highly unstable nature, and frequently move at
slight provocation not only from one kind of security to another but
also, often for political reasons, from one country to another. These
funds thus invested do not exhaust by any means the total of for-
eign funds held at the various chief financial centers. We would
therefore once more be faced with the problem of separating from
the total the percentage which is active on the stock exchanges.This
undertaking is doomed to failure because of a total lack of statistics.
It is even exceedingly difficult to obtainfairly reliable information
about aggregate international capital movements, nomatter whether
they are short-term or long-term capital.
Investment of funds by foreigners insecurities of another coun-
try need not always beof a highly unstable nature. Before1914
foreign government bonds wereoften held firmly by private in-
vestors of different nations.The French investment in Russian
securities is one of these cases,but there are many more. What
transfers occurred were frequentlyfor the major part between in-
dividuals of the same country,rather than a resale to the country
of origin or to a third. AfterWor!d War I the frequencyof shift
among countriesof foreign capital invested at agiven stock market
increased enormously. However onemust distinguishbetween
those influences of foreigncapital on a domestic stockmarket exer-
cised by foreign purchases orsales of securities inthe country of
the stock market and theholding of the securitiesthere, and those
influences which takeeffect by tradingof varying amountsof
domestic securities at aforeign stock market.
The problems connectedwith capital movements areso numerous
and complicated thatthey would have tobe taken up in aseparate
study. Only after theyhave been examinedwould it be possible to
This is the well-knowndifference betweenEuropean (Continental)and
Anglo-American banks.Cf. Adolf Weber,
Depo.riteflbafllcan und SpekulatlOM
banken, MuniCh, 1902,3rd ed., 1922; and F.Somaiy, BcnkpoUUIC,Tubingen,
3rd ed. 1934, passim,especially Fart ii.
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TABLE 130
Listed International Securities before 1914




Great BritaIn 10.9 Italy
Source: Estimated by Guiccioli and Auboynou and quoted by A. Neym
Bulletin de l'Instltut International de StatLitique. Vol. XII,p. 286. Per cent dj.
tribution in source erroneous and recomputed by us.







Source: Op. cit., Vol. xis. p. 226. (Results of an official stamping of certi11
cates in 1899.)
Portugal, interest payments for government bonds, 1906-1907, per cent
Source: Op. cit., Vol. xix, P. 337.
Includes Dutch investors and also Portugese bondholders who, without ex.
ception, preferred to cash their dividends in Paris, rather than In PortugaL
(Portugal's government became bankrupt in 1892.)
Russia
Around 1900, one-fourth of all Ilussian securities were held abroad, 70 pei
cent of them by French investors.
round Out whatever picture would be obtained of the interloclii,
of stock markets.
(3) We consider next another form of influence from abroad,











Source: Op. cit., Vol. ian. pp. 148-149.
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TABLE 130, continued
5, Number of foreign and domestic securities listed on Cerman exchanges
Source: Wormser, P. 221.
No foreign securities on nine other provincialexchanges.
Nominal Value
Number (millions of marks)
513
6. Listed and unlisted foreignsecurities in which transactions took place in
Hamburg, 1882-1892
(from the records of payments of the tax onforeign securities.)
Listed foreign securities 129 350
Unlisted foreign securities 549 208
Source: Berichtder Bosnenquête-KOmmisrion,Berlin, 1892-1893, Appendix,
p. 270.
The complete list of securitiescovered is avaiIabe in the source.
(table continues)
They can be of all categories(government or privatebonds, stocks,
etc.) and, as will be seenin Table 130, tradingin them often as-
sumes major proportions.The prices of these securitiesare subject
to the businessconditions and the prospectiveprofits of the corn-
panics in the respectivecountries where they aredomiciled and
do business, or both.The prices dependsif they are government
bonds, on the creditstanding of thesegovernmentSi.e., among
other things, on theirfinancial policy, and onthe interest rates on
the stock exchangeswhere they aretraded. These constitutehow-
ever only someof the influencesworking upon the pricesof these
securities. They arealso subject to theprice tendenciesof the re-
spective domestic issuesagainst whichthey can beexchanged.
Hence we findprofit expectationSand long-term interestrates of
FOREIGN GERMAN
BondsShares Bonds Shares
Augsburg 11 4 37 52
Berlin 158 56 520 914
Bremen 3 2 62 55
Breslau 14 - 63 63
Dresden 13 2 188 211
Frankfurt 197 45 278 269
Hamburg 122 17 173 131
Cologne 11 8 64 121
Leipzig 50 1 99 134
MunicT 31 4 89 95SECURITY MARKETS AND FOREIGNCAP17'AL
7. Nominal value of securities inClUded in the"Officiallist" of the Loud00Sttk Exchange, Dcc. 30,1999.
Government funds
Municipal bonds and securities guar-














(millions of £ )Per Cent
'Including foreign and colonial (see,for instance, subgroup "teaand coffee plantations").
Including some foreign municipalbonds.
Including funds payable inLondon (987).
& Nominal value ofsecurities officially listed in Parison Feb. 28, 1900





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































these countries interrelated. The degree of interrelatedness will de-
pend upon the number of different foreign securities and on the
amount of domestic capital investment in them.1° It certainly can-
not be expressed in simple terms.The reverse influence also holds.
Changes of profit expectations abroad, or of the various interest
rates, will produce acorresponding price change in the foreign
securities. This price movement will transmititself through nu-
merous channels to theprices of domestic securities.
If the foreign securities are payable in aforeign currency or in
go!4, then the variations of the exchangesof the two respective
countries also become price determiningfactors. This played a very
big role after 1914, when fluctuatingexchange rates were common.
However even before 1914fears were sometimes felt about the
stability of exchange rates,though not to the same extent. During
the year preceding the Baringcrisis of 1890 the instabilityof the
Argentine exchange was an importantfactor causing German in-
vestors in Argentineshares to sell their holdings.British investors
then were slower in makingsuch adjustments a fact thatcontrib-
uted to the extent of the Baringcrisis in Great Britain.
There are other instancesof fears about the maintenanceof ex-
change rates. European investorshad doubts as to thestability of
the dollar exchangeafter the passage of theSherman Silver Pur-
chase Act and beganlarge-scale sales of Americansecurities to in-
vestors in the UnitedStates, thus withdrawinggold from this coun-
try, a processwhich became cumulative.The continued silver cam-
paign of Bryanfurther contributed tothat movement.
Sometimes securitiesissued in one country areredeemable, or
interest anddividends are payable, asthe case may be,also in the
currency ofanother country-After World War Ithis became a
frequent practicewith far-reaching consequencesnot foreseen at
the time of issue. It wasnot restricted togovernment bonds,but
applied even toindustrial shares, e.g.,in Austria,which were then
often held abroad.This broughtexchange rateexpectations and
developments intothe pricerelationships of thesesecurities to
those of otherspriced only in thedomestic currency.
(4) There is stillanother form inwhich a domesticstock ex-
change may reflectbusiness conditionsabroad. This isthrough
securities issued bycompanies doingbusiness in foreigncountries,
perhaps exclusively, orto some majorextent. In thefirst case these
Cf. Ike Mmtz,Detel101aHoh) in theQuality ofForeign BondsIssued In
the United States,1920-1930, NationalBureau ofEconomic Research,1951.
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"domestic" securities are virtually equivalent to foreignones from
the economic point of view. Sometimes however thesecompanjs
are attached to truly domestic mother companies, and their dividend
policy is then determined not exclusively according to theproj
realized abroad. Rather it is formulated in conjunction with domes.
tic affairs of the mother company, in a way which cannoteasily
be determined by outsiders, in which case they would bealso
economically domestic, though technically at first sightequivalent
to foreign securities. There are numerous instances of this,e.g.,
gold mining, oil, shipping shares, etc.
Government bonds may also show some complications aside from
those mentioned eu her which are due to currency variations. These
securities are sometimes guaranteed by other governments orgroups
of governments. In these cases not two, but possiblymore, cir-
rencies have to be taken into accountonly however when the
debtor country is likely to default. Such guarantees becameof
practical importance in the period after 1922 with certain League
of Nations operations, but in general they arc rare.
(5) Though the statistical data on which this chapter is based
are fragmentary, as regards the volume of securities trading, it
appears that internat!onal migration of securities assumed con-
siderable proportions in the years before World War I, andplayed
a significant role in the international transmission of business cycles
through their effects on the movementson the stock exchanges. This
section wifi cite some of the statistics for illustrativepurposes; they
cannot serve for more because of their doubtful validity.
For 1874 R. L. Nash" estimated that funds of foreigngovern-
ments traded in London surpassed the total amount of all British
and cok.nial securities listed (£8.6 billion against £2.2 billion)."
In Paris the situation was similar. In 1891, 549out of 928 securi-
ties listed in Paris (Parquet) were foreign securities. Eighteen
European countries were represented by 67 differentgovernment
bonds alone, and 13 non-European countriescontributed 31 gov-
ernment securities.'3 Alfred Neymarck estimated'4 that the share
of foreign securities among French holdingswas about one-third.
For 1891 Théry' thought that France had21,000 million francs
"Penn's Compendium on the English andForeign Funds, Debts, and Rev-
enues of All Nations, London, 1874,p. v.
' This should be borne in mind below forjudging the significance of any
British share price index.
"Bulletin de Firistitug inernaftonal deStasistique, Vol. vi (1),Pp. 205 if.
"In various reports published in Ibid.
E. Thery, Lea Pro grês Economiques de La France,Fans, 1909, p. 307.
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invested in foreign securities, an amount that rose to 37,150 million
francs by 1907. Forthe same years foreign holdings of French
securities were estimated at 6,230million and 6,824 million francs
respectivelY. For the end of December 1908 we haveNeymarck's
estimate of foreign securities(including government bonds) at the
Paris Bourse of 67,645million francs, compared with 65,738 mil-
lion francs of domesticsecurities.'8
Among the lessercreditor countries of Europe, HollandiT
cupied a particular position.During the period 1875-1914 more
than half the securityholdings of Dutch investors consisted of
foreign securities. Asearly as 1865, 89 foreign securities were
listed, but only 24 Dutchand 3 colonial securities; inAmsterdam the
number of Russiansecurities traded nearly equaledthat for all of
flolland. In 1895, 232Dutch, 92 colonial, and not lessthan 458
foreign securities(including 150 American and 48Russian rail-
ways) were dealt in.During the twenty yearsbefore the out-
break of World War Iforeign securities lost someground, but in
January 1914Dutch securities still wereless than half theofficial
list-69' against 265colonial and 840 foreign, amongwhich were
302 United Statessecurities.
For the internationalinfluence of a stockexchange the position
which its countryoccupied in the worldeconomic system was more
important than thenumber of foreign shareslisted.15 Though prac-
tically no foreignshares were dealt in onthe New YorkStock Ex-
change, its tendencywasanxiously watched bythe European
speculators. Andthough Dutch andBelgian exchangeswere
swamped by foreignsecurities, theyexercised little influenceof
their own andusually followedthe movementsof the exchanges
of the majorcountries whosesecurities werelisted there.19
it appearsthat many crisisfactors wereof internationalorigin
and affected allbourses at the sametime (seeChart 71). Thefre-
quently reappearingwar scarein Europe inmany caseshalted
1c"French Savings andTheir Influence uponthe Bank of Franceand upon
French Banks,"appendix to M. Patron,'Tbe Bank ofFrance," NatiorUiiMone-
tary CommissiOn,1910. Thedifference inestimates islarger than canbe
accounted for by thelime difference.Patron himselfstates thatEngland owned
foreign securitiesmountiflg to 55,000million francs,but gives nofurther
source. For1903 theAdininiStratibdes Domainesestimated the totalof
French investmentsabroad at 29,855milliOn francs,but these werenot held
onl' in the formof securities(Cf. Patron, p.13n).
1 All data for Holland arefrom L.Brenn1kb0eYer, Die
AnisteTdaT1u'' Effek-
tenbörse, Berlin,1920.
See H.Cebhard, Die BerlinerBörse, Berlin,1928, pp. 130-131,
footnote 2.
"See T. Benz,La Boursedes ValeurSMobiliè,'m aThlle, 1933, p.100.
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simultaneously the expansionary movement, or provoked on alt
bourses a brisk contraction (1887,1912). Expansionarymovemen
seem to have originatedoften on one exchange (usually as a result
of a turn in general business) andthen to have affected favorab1.
the tendency of exchanges in other countries. Here again the dis-
tmction between "major" and"minor" countries is necessaly;an
expansion in France would spread toHolland, Belgium, or Switzer-
land, and usually to German exchanges too,but a local recovery in,
say, Belgium would notaffect Paris or London significantly. His-
torical studies frequently record how panics on one exchange
spread to others, but usually explain recovery in temis of an im-
provement in general economic conditions inthe respective coun-
try and abroad, not as a spreadof mere optimism from exchange to
exchange.2°
Major contractions and speculative crashes occurred simultane-
ou.sly on all European exchanges (1873, 1882, 1884, 1890, 1895.
1900, 1907, 1912), though their intensity was usually different. In
addition the stock exchanges of each country had their particular
movements of domestic origin, e.g., in connection with the nation-
alization of railroads in Germany and Switzerland, the collapse of
the French copper corner, etc., but in the annals of every exchange,
movemciits which were connected with simultaneous crises on
other European exchanges were more frequent than similar eveiits
of local origin.
No adequate statistical data ire available to estimate the volume
and character of international securities arbitrage operations. For
example, Patron states that in 1890 Britain sold huge quantities of
United States rails in Paris, both stocks and bonds, later repur-
chased by America.21 Thry and others state that the Bank of Eng-
land was powerless "to prevent the flurried and anxious English
market from flooding the Paris market with international securi-
ties."22 But more definite estimates are 1acking?
Though only relatively few brokerage firms were engaged in the
arbitrage business proper, many brokers and bankers were con-
But compare the influence of American oudook on Canadian movements
in R. B. Bryce, "The Effects on Canada of Industrial Fluctuations In the United
States." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political ScIence, August 1939
Cf. also E. Marcus, Canada and the international Business Cyck 1927-1939
New York, 1954.
"Op. clt.p. 96n. Thery, op. cit., p. 288.
The literature indicates that arbitrage operations in Europe were conducted
mostly with government securities. American-European arbitrage was almo
exclusively in United States railroad shares and bonds.
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nected with the marketing of American securities abroad. It is
significant for the close relation between the transoceanicflow of
American securities and the United States foreigntrade balance that
the reporters of theCommercialand FinancialChroniclefrequently
linked the alleged volume of securities sold in orrepatriated from
Europe with exports of cotton,wheat, or tobacco. The weekly re-
ports on the foreignexchange market frequently mentioned the
(alleged) direction and the (alleged)magnitude of this flow of
securities. It seems thatbankers specializing in foreign exchange
operations were particularly activein foreign trading with Ameri-
can securities.24
In addition to arbitrageoperations, New York Stock Exchange
brokers often took advantageof lower interest rates in Londonby
transferring to that city largelines of stock and carried themfor
speculative purposes.25 In someinstances American railroadbuild-
ers paidtheir British suppliers withbonds rather than cash, which
were laterbought back when the newrailroads began to yield profits.
(6) There exist foreach of the fourcountiicsUnited States,
Great Britain, France,and Germanya numberof stock price
indexes from which onehas been selected as servingour purpose
best, i.e., the longestmonthly series for theperiod to 1914 (cf. the
appendix to this chapter).In this respect there aredifferences: the
American, British,and German indexes startin 1877, 1867,and
1870 respectivelYwhereas the monthlyFrench index isavailable
only from 1897(although the Paris Boursewas ofconsiderable
importance duringthe precedingyears).
None of theselected series (shownin Chart 71)contains for-
eign shares,though they did form alarge part of allsecurities
transactions. Thereforethe indexes mightbe taken to representthe
movement ofdomestic share prices.Even this is trueto only a
limited extent; stocksof companiesdoing businessabroad, through
exports or byoperating plants inforeign countries,might reflect
foreign businessconditions morethan domestic.Tining and
amplitude of the pricemovement of theseshares may begoverned
by foreign ratherthan by domesticbusiness cycles.If there are
many suchshares in theindex, any numberof tendenciesofthe
same kind, orneutralizing eachothermaybe brought intothe
domestic picture.
See, for example,the Chronicle,March 5, 1881,. 242.
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The American index is probably littleexposed to theseinfluec during the years 1870-1914, this country thenbeinga debtorcj try depending heavily for its industrial developmeit
upon the of foreign capital. Its exportswere mainly agriculthral
whIch in. volved few joint stock companies listedin New York.Ame'j railroad shares, which were the dominanttype of issuetradeduntil about 1909, are free from the above-mentionJ
internatjonjl plications, also because of the absence oftransit traffic,whichconk. plicates the picture in most EuropeanCoUfltries with theexcep of England, where howeverno railroad shares areincluded ithe index. But in the latter country the haulingof freight forepot makes the railroads dependentupon the foreign activitiesof domes. tic firms more than in the United States,where thepercentage of export freight was small before 1914 (inspite of bulkygrains) and most certainly has not risen tosignificance even afterWorld WarJ26
The British index containsa (varying) number of
transportation shares. They do not include railroads,but shipping, buslines, dock- ing establishments, andcommunication companies. Shippingbusi- ness obviously depends toa high degree on economicconditions abroad. In the othergroups, too, the British indexcontains many firms doing business abroad,in keeping with the factthat British "internal" business conditionscan hardly be separated fromthese external influences during theperiod considered. In thetwo con- tinental countries the situationis not quite thesame, French busi-
ness probably being more domesticallydetermined than that of Germany.
Section 2, Cyclical Behaviorand Covarialion of Stock
Market Prices in FourCountries
(7) There isan obvious but deep interest indetermining the
cyclical behavior andcovariation of the share price indexes because
of the traditionallyhigh significance thatstock market events in
important countjies havefor others. Furtherniore thereare the flows
of investible fundsthe main forces of whichwe examined in con-
nection with interestrate differentials, It will also beimportant to make as completea list of stock market panics and collapses for











Number and Duration of Specific Cycles of Share Price Indexes
of Four Countries
(seasonally uncorrected except Great Britain, 1925-1932)
AVERAGE DURATION OF:
NUMBER OF: (months)
Er- Con-Full Er- Con-Full
pensions fractions cycles'pensions tractions cycles
Prewar: February 1878August 1913,428 months
5 4 4 35.6
2 2 1 47.0
4 4 3 59.0
9 9 8 24.3











Durations of only complete cycle expansions and contractions areincluded in their respective
columns.
The percentages are calculated from a base equal tothe average duration of cycles only
when the number of full cycles is the same as thenumber of expansions and contractions.
Only complete cycles are counted; parts of cycles atboth ends of a series are dropped. Cycles
are measured from trough totrough. Similarly only complete expansions and contractions are
counted in their respective columns.
dFrance only from January 1898 to August 1913,188 months.
each country as we can, to establishtheir possible international
ramifications, and to examine towhat extent the indexes reflect
these occurrences. Because ofthe alleged sensitivity of stock mar-
kets to future developments weshall also consider leads and lags
between countries, in spiteof the limitations both as to thequality
of the indexes and the reluctance toattribute significance to leads
and lags when cycle determinationitself is open to many doubts
(cf. Chart 72).
For the prewar period,American share pricesshow twice as
many specificcycles as any of the othercountries' series (cf. Table
131), eight full cycles betweenFebruary 1878 and August1913,
compared with four for GreatBritain and three forCermany. (The
French series is notcomparable as it started inJanuary 1898.) All
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tions. Because of the greater numberof cycles, the
Americanserj has the shorter duration bothfor theexpansion andCOnajo phases, a relationship similarto that for the reference
cycles. The postwar period istoo short to justifygenerali0 two of the countriesFrance and
Germany.......recorda frill
Cycle between January 1925 andDecember 1932, though,inconra tion with each other, the formeris in expansion forseven thnes many months as it is in contraction,whereas the lattercounty shows a greater number ofmonths in thecontraction phase. If we compare eachcountry's specific shareprice cycle j respective reference cycle,we find that with oneexception_p war Great Britain, where the distributionis random_thetwo cycles are in the same phase for the majorityof the months(cf. Table 183). The bestagreement is for postwar UnitedStates, whilepre- war France (January l898-August1913) shows almostas high a percentage76.() per cent and 75.5per cent respectivelyboth significant.
The extent ofagreement varies slightly fromprewar to postwar, again with the exception ofGreat Britain. The UnitedStates shows a higher percentage ofagreement after the war than ineither of the prewar periods selected; Great Britainand France show lesspost- war agreement, while Germany'sagreement improves after thewai only if compared with theshorter prewar period(1898-1913). The only marked changeis that for Great Britain; for1878-1913 it was in similar phases during63.8 per cent of the period;for 1898-1913 the figure improvesto 70.2 per cent; but for thepostwar it drops to 50 per cent.
The goodcorrespondence between themovement of stock price indexes and referencecycles is not surprising.It must be noted that
our count is affected by thefact that lags and leadsare not con- sidered; thecovariation might be greater ifthe typical lead of stock priceswere taken into account.27 Acomparison of the speci& cycle and referencecycle turning points (Tables132 and 1) enable the reader tocarry out furthermeasurements (see also below Ta-
bles 187 and 138 forlags among the stockprice cycles).
"The average lead() or lag (+) relativeto the reference cycle was, in months:
Peak Trough
United States 6





Dates by Months of Specific Cydes of Stock Market Price
Indexes of Four Countries, Prewar and Postwar,
Seasonally Uncorrected'
GREAT BRITAIN
Peak Trough Peak Trough
May 1872 June 1871
June 1881 Jan. 1885
May 1887 June 1888
May 1890 Dec. 189()
Aug. 1892 Mar. 1895
Sept. 1895 Aug. 1896
Apr. 1899 Sept. 1900
Sept. 1902 Oct. 1903
Sept. 1906 Nov. 1901
Dec. 1909 July 1910
Sept. 1912 Dec. 1914
July 1919 Aug. 1921
Mar. 1923 Oct. 1923
Sept. 1929 June 1932
Feb. 1934 Mar. 1935




Nov. 1872 June 1871
Aug. 1881 Nov. 1885
Dcc. 1889 Nov. 1891
May 1899 Oct. 1901
Sept. 1905 July 1908
Sept. 1912 Dec. 1913b
June 1924
Jan. 1925 Dec. 1925
Apr. 1927 Apr. 1932
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Seasonally corrected for GreatBritain, 1925 to 1932.
b Last month available before WorldWar I.
'First month available afterWorld War I.
First month available.
Oct. 1873 July 1819
Jan. 1880 Nov. 1887
Oct. 1889 Apr. 1892
Feb. 1900 Aug. 1904
Feb. 1901 Mar. 1909
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TABLE 133
Phase Comparison of Share Price Indexes and Respective
ReferenceCykes
Tables 134 and 185 deal with international comparisons of share
price cycles. Table 134 shows evidence of international solidarity.
For example, postwar American and British share prices are in the
same phase 92.7 per cent of the months.The four markets are in
the same phase 45.8 per cent of the months, also a highly significant
Egure. With the exception of the comparisons involving the Cer-
man series, there was a greater percentage of phase agreementafter
than before the war.
It is of interest to note that among the two-nation comparisons,
the prewar BritishUnited States couple shows up with the lowest
percentage of agreement. After World War I, as already mentioned,
these two gave the best agreement. This reverscs the trend of c-
integration observed in all previous series, where there waswavs
less correspondence after World War I. It would be interesting, if it
could be done quantitatively, to see w!iher the improving tend
in phase agreement was the resit of America's decreasing role as
a debtor. However, even at this stage, a generalization connecting
creditor-debtor relations with the agreement of share price mo"e-
532






Prewar: February 1878-August 1913, 428 months
Great Britain 141 131272 154 33.1 30.8 .8
Germany 190 103293 133 44.6 24.2I' 8
United states 187 122309 117 43.9 28.672.5
Prewar: January 1898-August 1913, 188 months
France 98 44142 46 52.1 234755
Great Britain 78 54132 50 41 5 28.770.2
Germany 86 35121 87 45.7 18.664.4
United States 88 47135 53 46.8 25.071.8
Postwar: January 1925-December 1932, 96 months
France 35 35 70 28 36.5 38.572.9
Great Britain 13 35 48 48 13.5 88.550.0
Germany 18 45 63 33 18,8 48.965.6
United States 40 33 73 23 41.7 34.478.0TABLE 134
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Prewar: January 1898-August1913, 188 months
55 38 9395 29.3
55 48 103 85 29.3
59 40 99 89 31.4
85 06 15131 45.2
93 41 13454 49.5
88 38 124 64 45.7

























































ment is doubtful.For example,in the shorterprewarperiod (1898-
1913) the threecomparisonsinvolving the maincreditor nation
Great Britain_Showboth the bestagreement (withthe creditor
nation France,80.3 percent) and thelowest (withthe United
States, 52.7 percent) of the sixcompariS01made.
It is of course aquestionwhether covariatiOIof these indexes
should be expectedat all andwhether itshould be higherfor one
phase rather thanfor another.If there isinteractiOn, itwill cer-
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But it is also knownespCCiallYfrom the experience of the l92o's..
that some stock marketsdeclined because others rose, not becasue
they became depressed(cf. Table 132). Such contrary movements
extend sometimes over severalmonths, a fact which accounts for
the lower conformity.Covariation may therefore be high betw11
two markets that inthis sense are both subject to influences from a
third, with which they wouldthen have a low correspondence. All
this is related to the time unitof the measurement and the speed with
which influences spread from onemarket to another, as in previous
cases. On thewhole therefore extreme care in interpretation is
mequired; the commentary merelyillustrates the facts which
too few and too diversified toyield a theory.
Table 135 shows the concentrationand dispersion of theturn-
ing points of the share priceindexes. It will be noted that the
average deviation of thelower turning point is greater than that of
the upper turning point, and thatthe coinciding peaks are a higher
percentage of all peaks thanthe coinciding troughs are of all
troughs. In other words the sharpness ofthe upper turning point
may result in greatersolidarity than the more gradual upswing. The
same was observed inother instances for different activities. Sinc
these upper turning points do notnecessarily coincide with panics.
they may be even better correlated.All this points back to the
analysis of the "effort" series (Chapter VII) andthe dates found
there, and forward to section 3 below where panics areconsidered.
Table 136 gives the sign correlations, covering comparisons of
month-to-month movements of share prices. A high coefficient a'
the proper probability level indicates a greatsimilarity of move
ment between two successive months.Although some such indica
lion is present in all but one of the groups(postwar Great Britain
and Germany), in none is there a similarity of movement even as
high as for two-thirds of the monthly changes. Thevalues nowher
reach the highest observed in other sign correlations,especiall,
with exchange rates and short-term interest rateswhere C0.
with p <0.001 was not uncommon (Table 137).
Neither is there any clear similarity in the patterns ofthese two
as could perhaps be expected. Butthe interrelations which neces
sarily must exist among these markets are probablyof a muc
deeper nature than has been revealed thus far. ThisnoncyCliCJ
measurement takes care of earlier observations aboutthe economi
reasons for not expecting strong covariation amongstock mark'
price indexes. Here it is seen that the low correspondenceis reduce
further when the definition of a specific cycle is not applied.
534t
TABLE 135
Concentration and Dispersion of Specific Cycle Turning
Points of Share Price Indexes
Three countries



























January 1898_AuguSt1913, 188 months
1903 13.77
1908 5.33
January 1898_August1913, 188 months
May 1908 6.00 6.00





































Coinciding peaks: withinthe range ofpeaks is no trough.
The arithmetical meanof the coincidingpeaks or troughs iscomputed. If
the average failsexactly between twomonths, bothmonths are reported.If the
average fails moreclosely into onemonth, only thismonth is reported.
united States, GreatBiitain, Germany.
4France, GreatBritain, Germany.
'United States, France,Great Britain,Germany.
Coinciding troughs:within the rangeof troughs is nopeak.SECURITY MARKETS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL
TABLE 136
Sign Correlation of Share Prices of Various Countries
536
N = number of pairs of differences observed.
Z = number of times change of price showed same sign (zero change counted
as one-half).
p = probability that an observed deviation from the expected value as great
or greater is due to chance.
C = coefficient of covariation.
The fact that the indexes correspond oftenas well with the refer-
ence cycles, i.e., with domestic conditions, as with each other dis-
appoints the expectation that the stock markets forma more closely
knit community than is apparent. However foreign sharesare not
considered by the indexes and interaction neednot be of the sim-
ple kind that would cause these indexes tomove in the same direc-
tion.
(8) As a rule we did not studyleads andlags of series beyond





Germany-Great Britain 527315.0 p> .000010.195
January 1899-December 1918
Germany-France 179103.00.00 > p> .07 0.1515
January 1871-December 1913
Germany-United States 515290.0 p) .01 0.1266
January 1871-June 1914
United States-Great Britain521307.5 p > .001 0.1804
January 1899-Jime 1914
Great Britain-France 185118.0 p) .001 0.276 1
January 1899_July 1914
1)iiited States-France 186112.0 p> .01 0.2042
Postwar
December 1924-I)ecejnber 1934
(;eniiaiiy-Greit Britain 12057.5- 0.0416
December 1924-July 1935
Cermanv-Fraiice 12765.50.74 > p) .75 0.0315
December 1924-July 1935
Germany-United States 12770.50.25 > p> .26 0.1103
December 1924-December 1934




12068.00.32 > p> .33 0.1004
United States-France 168104.0 p) .01 0.2382I
STOCK MARKET PRICES
some adaptationof the measures of sign correlation in some in-
stances.28 Stock prices, however, are generally thought to herald
movements in general business within a country. Furthermore in-
creased activity in one center may foreshadow the same in another
country, but the relations may be highly unstable. For example,
while a boom in London may produce one in New York later, a
depression in New York may precede one in London, etc. Leads or
lags may arise only in connectionwith the rate of change in each
market and with the absolute level of prices in theother markets.
With no formal hypothesis to be formulated a priori, or onthe basis
of the regularities thus farfoimd in this work, it is necessary to
approach in a purely empirical manner the questionwhether leads
and lags exist. In particularthe question whether leads and lags
could be expected in monthly series posesitself again. The main
difficulty is once more that a month is along interval of time for fast
reacting markets, so that truelags may be hidden by choosing this
time interval, althoughthis is somewhat doubtful, especially inthe
light of Table 135. Alsothe lagging of our seriesvill undoubtedly
be aflected greatly bythe insufficiency in the internationalmake-up
of the indexes, which wasdiscussed at length above.
With all these and otherreservations in mind, weshow in Tables
137 and 138 comprehensivemeasurements, based on thespecific
cycles of the four series.Table 137 shows separatelyfor the prewar
and postwar periods thelags and leads of thepeaks and troughs.
The respective turningpoints themselves arealso entered (cf.
Table 132). Therighthand columns showexhaustively the leads
and lags (in months)of the American,British, and Germanstock
price indexes relative tothe others. Table138 gives the summary
representation in which,for all pairs of countries,the numbers of
leads, lags, and coincidencesare shown aswell as the averagedura-
tion of the former two.
Before discussing theresults of themeasurements itshould be
pointed out that theleast reliablerelationship involvesthe United
States, in viewof the largenumber of "extra"cycles there (before
World War I) andthe correspondingdifficulty of selectingthe
"corresponding" cycles inthe paired country.Some peaksand
troughs have to beskipped. It isreasonable to useonly those dates
nearest to thepeaks and troughsof the pairedcountry, butthe
skipped Americanpeaks and troughsstand by themselvesin isola-













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































eSECURiTY MARKETS AND FOREIGN CAPITAL
domestically or internationally? There is no answer to this and other
basic questions merely on the basis of the present observations.
Furthermore the prewar observations are based on a larger sample
which makes the averages more representative.
The following comments summarize some of the information in
Tables 137 and 138:
Prewar peaks. There were as many leads as lags of IJnited
States stock prices in relation to the British. in respect to German
and French the American stock price cycles more often led or coin-
cided. The same pattern holds for the British cycles in regard to the
two continental ones, and Germany's cycles always led or coincided
with the French.
Postwar peaks. There is not much disturbance of the pre-
World-War-I setup. There is no clear change in the average length
of the lead or lag duration, which varies for the peaks inprewar
from 9.3 months to 0.2 months and in the postwar period from 9.5
to 0.7 months.
Prewar troughs. The United States in all instances lagged
only once, Britain lagged always behind France and Germany,
while the latter country once led and once lagged compared with
France. This is a somewhat clearer and perhaps more significant
picture than the one obtaining for peaks.
Postwar troughs. The American relation to the three others
is reproduced, but in the British case there are two lags against
Germany but three leads against France. There is no change in the
relations between the German and French cycles. Theaverage
length of prewar trough lead or lag (hiration varies between 19.2
and 2.0 months, in postwar between 12.7 and 1.5 months, i.e.,a
narrowing.
Looking at the averages for the periodas a whole, we can say
that the American cycle tended to lead in theupturn fromthe
troughs, while before the war Britain led in the (lownturn from
tile peak. France lagged behind both America and Britain,except
in the trough phase before W'orld War 1, when she ledBritain. The
only marked changes from prewar topost%'ilr were: (1) a slight
prewar lag at the peak of the German relative to the British series,
changing to a slight lead (of 1% months) after thewar; and (2)
the prewar French leadover the British, changing to an even
greater lag after the war (a seven months' lead changingto a nine
months' lag).
Considering the smallness ofour sample. generalizations are
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exceptionallY hazardous. Tentatively we can say that the downturns
before World War I started in the United States or Great Britain,
while the prewar upturns almost all started in the United States, as
did two of the three after the war. France generally lagged behind
the other countries, while Germany was in a middle position.
The uncertainties in these patterns however should not be dis-
regarded. In some cases the matching of the cycles would change
the lead or lag, and the averages as well. Forexample, did the
American peak of May 1887 lead theGerman one of December
1889, or (as we have assumed)did the latter lead the May 1890
American peak? We have selectedthose two nearest each other
chronologically, but that may not be justified.On the other hand
the British trough of March1909 was linked with the more distant
American trough of November1907, rather than the nearer July
1910, because it was feltthat the 1906-1907 cycle was probably
more widespreadin its repercussions. There arelags as long as
thirty-four months (betweenthe British trough of August 1904and
the German trough ofOctober 1901). Can we safely assumethat
it took that long totransmit the cycle influence?These and other
doubts compel us toregard the results as very tentative,requiring
a great dealof further investigation.There can be no doubt that
what is described in thesesimple measurements is"true." But there
is also no doubtthat the apparentlysimple. intuitively clear notion
that one event"follows" anothereven leavingaside whether it is
a propterhoc, instead of merely apost hoc_involvescomplicated
and far-reachingassumptions. Analysis ofbusiness cycles, asavail-
able in the literature,does not offerguidance in the presentcir-
cumstance andrelying on common sensealone can be very mis-
leading. This appliesparticularly to situationsof a high degreeof
complexity where it is notat all clearwhat "commonsense" means.
Section 3. StatisticallYDetermined TurningPoints,
and Panics onStock Markets
(9) The directcomparison of thecycles of fourstock price
indexes in section 2yielded some surprisinginformation: in spite
of the length of themonthly series therewere fewcycles, although
the series describemarkets notoriousfor wide swingsand often
sudden movementsof evencatastrophic proportionS.It is further-
morecommonplace to assumethat themarkets of differentcoun-
tries interact veryclosely. Now it iseasy tofind fault withthe
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mdexes themselves. We have seen that their coverage is iflacleqL1ite
inasmuch as foreign securities are omitted. Besides there are many
other stock markets that should be included for reasons of possible
interaction, because at one time or another they have played a big
role, sometimes even exceeding that of the stock markets of large
countries. Among those to be considered at varying periods would
be: Vienna, Amsterdam, ZUrich, Brussels, Milan, and Basel. For
these places sufficient indexes do not exist and what is available
does not take good account of foreign securities, which are precisely
those stocks in which they traded most heavily.
Since this situation cannot be remedied quantitatively at pres-
entit would be an expensive project of vast proportionswe do
two things at once: we broaden the basis of our observations by
considering also the stock markets of Vienna, ZUrich, and Amster-
dam, but do this in a nonquantitative, i.e., nonnumerical, way. As a
consequence we shall no longer look for a correspondence of entire
cycles, a procedure which is clearly tantamount to employing a
rather intricate hypothesis. We shall instead relax our requirements
and choose a more direct and simpler approach. It consists in con-
cerning ourselves with the peaks and troughs in stock market acti'-
ity, taking our information from far wider records than those offered
merely by the indexes, and checking the latter against this general
information. Or in other words: we shall try to establish a com-
plete series of panics or other crises involving chiefly the security
markets and check the indexes against that list. It will be found
that the indexes do not always reflect them in a way correspond-
ing to the other indications and descriptions used. Such a test
requires of course passing upon the merits of this other material.
In order to give names to the two kinds of occurrences, we call
the specific cycle peaks and troughs determined by the National
Bureau technique "statistical," and the othergenerally very sud-
dendisturbances based on further records simply "panics." We
do not wish to suggest, by choosing this word, that the downturns
which we find by this old and common procedure were invariably
panicky in a narrower sense of runs, disasters, etc. Many of them
were of this nature, however, and wherever necessary we shall reg-
ister this additional psychological fact separately. It is more diffi-
cultlacking figuresto indicate their magnitude, though a quan-
titative measurement would be of primary importance. However it
is precist'Iy the stock price index which is devised to establish such
a numerical value. But our task is more modest, namely, first to
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determine whether all the (nonstatistically determined) panics
coincide in all cases with the peak or trough positionof the in-
dexes, and onlysecondly to raise the additional question of a
quantitative correspondence regarding magnitudeof change.
(10) The notion of a panic is atfirst too vague to be used with-
out furtherqualifications. It occurs often in the literature,29 espe-
cially in the numerousolder writings which frequently sprang from
the observationof rather violent occurrences on stock exchanges
that spread to otherfields of financial and industrial activities.
Bankruptcies in financeusually followed fairly soon.
It is therefore best not torely on essentially verbal statements,
often made underthe impression of the day. Instead wegive a
brief description of thosephenomena, sufficient to establish the fact
that the stock marketshave been upset to such a degree as toim-
press conteflipOralycommentators, and often alsolater recorders,
and to 1ustify characterizingthese disturbances as panics.
Panics can occurduring any phase of thecycle, though they
might be expectedtoward the crest of the expansionarymovement
and shortly after. Inthe second part of thenineteenth century
sudden disturbances attimes other than the crest werenoted, seem-
ingly due chiefly tointensive speculativeactivity of influential
financiers, to thecreation of corners,pools, and the like.Such
operations havethrown markets intoconfusion and broughtabout
a collapseof prices at a timewhen the generalmarket situation
did not seemvulnerable. These pricefalls were thenquickly
overcome. Inother instances panicsoccurred at or nearthe upper
turning pomt ofbusiness cycles,thereby initiating adownward
movement of pricesfrom which there wasno suchspeedy recovery.
Panics will hardly everbe observed atthe lower turningpoints.
though it must benoted that there are someattributable to random
political influences(dangers of var,political scandals,etc.) which
may makethemselves felt at anytime of thecycle.
Among theCharacteristics commonto all ofthem are the con-
centrated, nuzssivesalesofsecurities withsecondary regardfor the
prices currentlyrealized. Thedesire to getrid of thesecurities
expresses thebelief that lessrapid salesmould only resultin still
greater losses.Pressure isexercised to repaybrokers' loansand to
But no precisestatements are tobe foundanywhere Even theclassical sur-
veys inPaigrave'SDictlOflhirtJof PoliticO1EconOmY, inthe EncyClOP6cthof
Social SciewC' andthe Hand wö.buch derStaatswissen1t0ftet, containonly
vague referencesto "fear,"
.qyprspeculation. "massfailures," "crashes"and
the like. It is notnecessary toreproduce thesestateme0t
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actively concerned, that a majorunfavorable event had taken place.
However imprecise the notionof panic is, it is here meant to
relate to the stockmarket primarily. There have been panics in the
economiclife of nations, e.g., in currency, commodities, etc., that
have not been as greatupsets on the stock markets as other events
which were moretechnically associated with the latter, e.g., be-
cause a prominentbank may have been involved, etc. For that
reason Table139 contains only a selection from allpossible panics
that might prove tobe interesting for the determination of the inter-
national picture. A well-knowndisturbance in New York in 1903-
1904, the "richman's panic," is not listed, although eventermed a
panic in mostworks, because it was a slow,steady fall in stock
prices lackingentirely fast selling for liquidity purposes.This shows
the uncertaintyof the terminolOgy.
(11) In the subsequentcomparison of the dates ofthese panics
with the respectivestock price indexes, we do notnecessarily look
for their coincidencewith upper turning pointsof the statistical
series. Peeks andpanics need not coincide.But if the existence of a
panic of somemagnitude at a given time canbe satisfactorily
established throughacceptable descriptive sourcesthen we must
expect a sharpdotvnward movement ofthe stock price index at
exactly the same date nomatter what thephase. The degreeof
decrease of theindex and_possiblytSduration should thenbe
a quantitativeexpression of someof the features of thecorrespond-
ing panic.
Since we do notnecessarily requireabsolute correspondencebe-
tween the dateof a panic and apeak of a specificcycle of our four
indexes, we arefreed fromecousidering thedifficulties of ascer-
taining thesepeaks. Still less is itnecessary toinsist on a coin-
cidence of a panicwith a trough,although this willbe produced if
the panic is transitory,short-lived, interrupts anupward movement,
and also is reflectedby the index.This shows that novery rigid
rules can be laiddown about thereflection of panicsby our series.
The limitation isnot nearly asbad as it may seemto be, because
the evidence tobe presentedand discussedbelow is sufficiently
strong, even asmatters stand now,to provethe restrictedvalue of
the indexes forestablishing thecorrelation ofthe eventwith its
alleged measure.
In Table 139and Chart 72only years aregiven for thepanics.
This differs from ourusual insistence onmonthly dataand does not
take care of thefact that theoutbreak of apanic may evenhave
5451873Collapse after Crüiiderjahre in Germany, begun In May withpanic in
Vienna; collapse of American Railroad speculation (Scpteniher);less ef-
fect upon 1..ondon, even less on Paris; one of the worst stockexchange panics on record; clear evidence of transmissions throughout theyear
extended to Amsterdam and Zurich
1875Separate, possibly independent, breakdowns on the exchanges ofLondon
(political) and Paris (Credit Mobilier)
1878 London (bank failure)
1879Paris and New York (independent, in this order)
1880 New York (Reading failure), influenceon London; Berlin and Vienm
with mutual influences
1881Paris and New York (both panics minor)
1882Crash of Union Générale in Paris, first class panic there;panics in Berlin,
Vienna, Amsterdam, and Zurich,some influence also on London
1884New York, bank failures, frauds Lineovered, sharpbut short panic with
few repercussions abroad excepton London dealings in Americaiise- curities
1887Separate, independently caused panicson all European stock markets;
later complex interactions whichcannot be traced adequately caused
chiefly by political tensions andwar fever
1889Paris, collapse of French coppercorner with New York affected
1890Baring incident in London, panics in Paris,Berlin, and thence Iii Vienna;
panic in New York in mutual relation withLondon
1891Panic in Austria, carriedover to Cennany with influence on Paris
1893 New York, collapse of NationalCordage Co., one of the worstAmerican panics; influence oii London and Germany,but no panic recorded there
1895Collapse of international speculationin South African gold shares;panics in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna,Amsterdam, Zurich, center in Pariswith influences on all European markets;no influcnce vu New ior where in-
dependent panic due towar scare (possible intervention in Venezuela);
Vienna particularly affected byParis and New York panics; largesale of foreign-held Americansecurities
1899Local, brief panic in New York;no repercussions known
1900Panic in Berlin (mining shares),influences upon Vienna; failure ofLon- don & Globe Finance Co. butno panic in London
1901Collapse in New York ofNorthern Pacificcorner; large selling in New York especially by foreignersin short position; LIIX)fl Londoji, but no panic there
1904Severe panics in Berlin and Parisover rumor and olitl)reak- of war be- tween Russia and Japan; Influencesupon London; foreign selling in New York but no panic there
1907 Two very severe panicsin New York, the first withsevere panic induced in Berim and Amsterdam, lesssevere in Paris none in London;panic in Vienna; many interlockinginfluences among all stockmarkets noted 1912Panics in Paris and Viennaat the outbreak of Balkan\Var, leading to panic in Berlin; influencesupon London only indirect
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TABLE 139




International Stock Exchange Panics*
1914 Ultimatum and later outbreak of World War I with panic and closing of
stock exchanges in Europe; closing of London exchange without jre-
ceding panic, but other influences; no panic in New York but closing of
stock exchange
(1921)b
1929Panic of large proportions in New Yorkseveral waves; influenceson all
other stock exchanges but nowhere outright panics
1931Closing of many exchanges, strong mutual influences originating from
Vienna, then from Berlin, and finally from London; nowhere a real panic
in the preceding sense
This table is one of the bases for Chart 71, where the interaction is more
fully demonstrated (see the final Appendix for further chronological informa-
tion). The cources used are trade journals, such as Commercial & Financial
Chronicle, Statist, Economist, works on stock exchanges, economic histories;
some of these are listed in thc various pertinent chapters of this book. We re-
peat that a list of panics is not necessarily a list of crises or depressions or both.
b This year falls outside the periods considered in this work and the uncertain
events such as inflation, etc. on the stock exchanges are therefore not counted.
been associated with a particular day, if not hour. But the descrip-
tive material is of such varying character for the different countries
that it was best to refrain from making a very fine measurement.
The main interest is, at any rate, the general pattern of interna-
tional simultaneity and perhaps interconnectedness of panics;both
must first be established in principle.Considerable historical re-
search would be required to use the procedureadapted here for
monthly comparison.
Chart72and Table139collect what seems to be as complete a
list of panics as can be establishedwithout engaging in substantial
historical studies involving primarymaterial. This is not our task.
The chart will however serve to bringout a number of important
features: (1) in not less than twentyof the forty-one years from
1873-1914panics occurred at least in oneof the seven countries
considered. The total number of panicsis a high incidence forthe
seven countriesconsidered. For the timeafter World War I a
minimum of two more yearshas to be added, maintainingthe high
percentage of the totalnumber of years. A definitiondifferent from
ours would perhapshave producedsomewhat changed numbers,
but those listed here seem tobe well established.
The interpretation of thechart is simple: acircle indicates
a domestic panic ofproportions sufficientlylarge to warrant recog-
547Source Table 139.
CHART 72
International Stock Exchange Panics, 1873-1932
First magnitude panic
Second magnitude panic














































































nition, but less strong i-n comparison with those marked bya
square. A triangle, as distinguished from a circle, indicatesa minor
domestic panic, possibly the after-effect of an earlier disturbance of
the same kind. Panics marked by a square are in the nature ofa dis-.
aster and are never isolated; repercussions are then always reported
on other stock exchanges.32 These are shown by solid or broken
arrows pointing to the country affected. A solid arrow indicates a
strong influence, a broken arrow a weaker one, Sometimes an
arrow is shown to a country without a panic. This means simply that
panicky influences made themselves felt toward the country in
which the arrow's tip falls, butaccording to our information
they were absorbed in the country affected without leading to a
rout on the exchange. This may have been because of the weak-
ness of the influence, or because it came at a time when the affected
exchange was not easily thrown out of balance or, finally, because
of the imposition of controls maintaining or restoring confidence.
The classical case for the latter possibility is the Baring incident
in London (1890), which did not degenerate into afull crisis.
The basis for inclusion of a certain date as a panic wasalways a
description, by at least one authority, of eventsthat fall within the
above broad definition. We did not let ourselvesbe guided by the
indexes, but rather propose, in the following, tocheck these two
against each other. Since both sources areimpure it is not possible,
once and for all, todecide whether one sort of information is better
than the other. In fact even if theindex should not register a panic
at the cycle turning points, itmight do so in the phase between
them. Therefore we shall make anoccasional direct comparison
(cf. Chart 71). It will alwaysinvolve a conflict of information, im-
possible of resolution in the lightof present information,though we
shall be inclined to place moreconfidence in the ordinary,literary
sources than inthe statistical compilations.But even here great
difficulties arise. For example,the 1893 panic in theUnited States
was severe onthe New York StockExchange. We show an in-
fluence upon London. However,Clapham, always writingwith
authority, does not report anyinfluencein spite of thefact that
the bank rate wasfrequently changed and evena goldstandard
scare existed inthe United States.Of course theabsolute height of
For each countsy only oneexchange is taken. Purelydomestic repefcusSiOflS.
e.g., from Berlin toFrankfurt, from Lyon to Paris,etc., are notmentioned.
The BankofEngland, Vol.U; neitherdoes he mentionthe Globe failure in
1900.
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the rate, never exceeding 5 per cent, might indicate that nothing
much had happened or was threatened. But we know that the bank
had other means available, arid nothing is known about how they
were used,
In the period before 1914 there are three major panics charac-
terized by the simultaneous occurrence of squares in severalcom.
tries. They are the years 1873 (Gründer crisis), 1895 with its col-
lapse of gold speculation, war scares, and political upheavals, and
1907 with its great crisis which is perhaps the event most to the
liking of the student, because it offers almost every feature the
textbooks tend to mention. It is also the best known crisis, because
a number of competent studies exist for several countries. After
\Vorld War I there are also two entries of this sort, 1921 and 1929,
with 1931 pini1g an uncertain role. The first was the crisis of the
'ar's end, while 1929 needs no further explanation.3 In 1937 sharp
decreases of stock prices occurred, but the inclusion of thisyear in
the previous categories is somewhat doubtful. It is noteven cer-
taut that it should be mentioned for the United States alone.
The chronologies in the appendix of this book give the general
framework within which each panic must be seen. Therefore it is
not necessary either here or in Chart 71 to he more specific about
the often important political connotation.
There is a difference in the incidence of panics in the various
countries. Before 1914 France is listed ten times, exceeding by two
even the United States. This is not surprising, consi(lering the highly
unstable character of French politics andsome big scandals of
various kinds (Dreyfus, Panama). Yet it does not necessarilycon-
tradict the fact of the great influence of the Bank of France,or its
policy of great gold hoards, and a (nominally) stable rate of dis-
count. The bank was not strong enough or used its influence badly.
the gold hoards (lid not help (theywere not used decisively), and
political scandals were apparentlymore important than time inter-
est rate. Holland and Switzerland are mentioned only five times. This
may however be due to a difference in the kind of data. 1877 and
1912 are particularly interesting: in the firstyear all six European
countries register a panic but thereare no clear influences of one
upon another to warrant an arrow in the chart; this was the'ar
scare, due to the signing of the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-
"In no case did the panics break out preciselyat the sinw moment of time;
often only a few days would intervene. This is immaterialfor our purposes which
do not require such microscopic observations.
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Hungary and Italy, which upset the power balance in Europe.
America was not affected, war and Europe then being still very far
away. Thesecond was the outbreak of the Balkan War, whichin-
volved the stock exchanges of the four great European powers, hut
not those of Holland and Switzerland. That of 1895 registers for all
countries, yet only the European stock markets are interaffected,
the center of the disturbances being in Paris, where a great col-
lapse of the speculation in gold shares occurred, which apparently
spread to the other markets, all directly engaged in holding gold
shares. New York, where African gold shares meant nothing, had its
autochthonous scare because of the threat by President Cleveland
to risk war over Venezuela, apossibility that however quickly
vanished. There are also two completely isolated American panics,
of 1884 and 1899, for which there is no evidence of a sufficiently
strong emanation to others torequire our arrows. Arrows were
however inserted for the panic of 1893, without theneed to mark
the decrease produced elsewhere aspanicky in those centers. The
only other instance of an isolated panic,with no panicky ramifica-
lions, is the Globe panic inLondon in 1900. Although the records
are at variance, wehave decided to consider the Globeaffair a
panic.
So we find that panics are veryrarely isolated. They occur some-
times in several countriessimultaneously, caused by a common
factor, mostly fear of war inthat case. As a nile they arestrongly
interconnected. The picture forthe interwar years is verysimilar
to that of the classicalperiod and need not bespecially described.
While internationally tradedsecurities have a directsignificance
in transmitting sharp pricedrops, undoubtedlypurely psychologi-
cal factors also play an importantpart,35 although this isadmittedly
a vague statementin the absenceof any deeperpsychological
analysis of such phenomena. Itis hard to see how arigorous study
could be made, given the presentstate of psychologY.
All these panics constitutemajor disturbancesnot only where
they occurred but also, by wayof ramification, inthose economies
that apparently remainedunaffected as far astheir stock market
levels are concerned. Inthe countriesdirectly affected,exchange
rates, interest rates,their differentialswith other markets,all Would
have to register thesedisturbances; seldomwould the disturbances
stv vn within themonetary field,although cases ofsuch isolated
XOn page 14 we spokeof "transmissionby imitation,"and we find here an
important instance where thisidea appearsplausible.
5.51Index of Stock Prices in Four Countries
Index of AllCommonStock Pricesinthe United States
(1935-1939=- $100)

















1929 195.6 237.8 (Sept.) 159.6 (Not'.) 162.4
1931 118.5 128.4 (Mar.)61.0 (Dcc.)81.0
1937 133.5 138.7 (Feb.)85.7 (Dcc.)85.7
Source: Cowks Commission and Standard and Poor's Corporation.
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Index of Prices of Industrial Shares in Great Britain'
(June 1913 = £100)
1873 124.7 128.4 (Oct.124.7 (Jan.)126.8 Nov. 125.8
Feb.)
1875 119.8 119.8 (Jan.,110.7 (Dec.) 110.7 May 119.5; June
Mar.)
187897.997.9 (Jan.)86.9 (Dec.)86.9 Aug.96.5
1880 107.1 107.1 (Jan.)99.6 (June) 102.2
1882 102.5 102.5 (Jan.)95.2 (Dec.)95.2
188789.189.1 (Jan.)82.0 (Nov.)86.0
1890 104.3 104.3 (Jan.)98.5 (Dec.)96.5
1895 105.8 117.5 (Oct.)105.8 (Jan.)116.3
1900 152.6 156.6 (Feb.)145.5 (Dee.) 145.5 Apr. 155.0; May
July 147.0
[904 128.2 132.1 (Dec.)126.7 (Aug.) 132.1
L907 141.4 141.6 (Feb.)130.2 (Nov.) 130.5 Mar. 137.7; July
1912 144.8 147.9 (Sept.) 141.8 (July)143.7 Apr.145.6; May
June 143.0; July
1929 145147(Feb.) 122(Nov.) 12.3
19319395(Mar.)77(Sept.)83Apr.93;May
Source: Royal Economic Society, Memorandum 47, June 1934.
End of month.
Points of unusual fluctuationSTATiSTICAL EXTREMA AND PANICS
TABLE 140, concluded
Index of Stock Prices in Germany
1913 = lOOM, prewar
1924-1926 = 100RM,postwar
193181.892.4 (Apr.)53.8 (Dcc.)53.8 May 83.0; June75.9
Source: Institut fürKonjunkturforschung.
Index of Stock Prices in France
(1913=100(c)
















Op High Loiv Close Points of unusual fluctuation
948 100.8 (Mar.)73.1 (Dec.)73.1 Apr.99.0; May 86.8
June 88.0; July81.6
41.4 636 (Dec.)41.4 (Jan.)63.6
67.010.4 (Feb.)62.0 (May)63.1
.969.8 (Aug.)65.1 (Feb.)66.7 Nov.68.3
67.868.3 (Oct.)61.9 (Feb.)67.4 Nov.66.1
99.199.7 (Jan.)84.1 (Nov.,84.1 Feb.94.9; Mar.89.5
Dec.) Apr.86.5
83.995.2 (Oct.)83.2 (Jan.)88.4 Nov.90.1
100.1 102.2 (Mar.)87.1 (Sept.,88.4 Apr. 101.6; May 98.6
Oct.) Juno94.7; July90.1
92.9 100.1 (Dec.)90.3 (Mar.) 100.1
101.8 101.8 (Jan.)90.1 (Aug.)90.9 Feb. 100.7; Mar.96.8
Apr.96.0; May95.1
June 92.5; July92.2
105.5 107.4 (Sept.) 100.7(Dcc.) 100.7
146.6 140.6 (Jan.)115.2 (Dec.) 115.2 Sept. 132.4; Oct.124.7
Nov. 119.8















1931 365313(Feb.) 221(Dec.) Aug. 304;Sept. 269SECURITY MARKETS AND FOREIGN CAPiTAL
UI)Sets are know'n especially for the United States. Sonic ofthese
other fields would also react in a violentulanner, considering the
delicacy of balance and the high volatility attributedto the financial
varial)les. The previous chapters offer ample material forchecking
these influences or, at least, if these cannot beascertaine(l specifi
cally, the simultaneous occurrence of disturbances. Thereader will
note that some variables are indeed affected, notably theshort-tei-n1
rate. From the point of view of that series these eventsmay appear
as random, since they do not fall into line with itsown cyclical
behavioranother illustration of liov difficulta proper notion of
randomness is.
Another important set of series to be consultedis that of the
effort series, presented and discussed in ChapterVII. We forego
a description since those charts show clearly how well thepanics
are reflected. To the (considerable) extent that theyare repre-
sented, the confidence in themeasures devised there grows. Since
those series show also other periods oftension for which, in turn,
we have at present no general descriptive material of thekind that
led to the establishment of thepanic dates, we may conclude that
these other periods also havea real meaning and are not mereh' the
result of some perverted calculations.It will be for the economic
historians to providemore descriptive material.
(12) The question remainsas to how well our indexes reflect these
panics. A comparison of the reportedpanics (Table 1:39) withour
indexes (Table 140 and Chart 71)shows very high agreement in
the sense that reported panics showup as sharp drops in prices of
securities. (It mtist be remembered thatour series are monthly
averages,SOthat the sharpness of pricemovements is somewhat less
than a daily oreven weekly series would register.)
There are a few exceptions however.Neither the 1881 nor the
1882 panics show up. The NewYork series does not show the effect
of the 1889 collapse of theFrench copper corner. In 1900 the in-
dexes show a widefllovem&nt in Gennanv and London, whereas
the accounts tell of panic inBerlin but not in London. The reported
1904 panics are not indicated inour series, while the London series
indicates a greater influencein 1907 than is explained by thecon-
temporary accounts.
The qualitative description,summarized in Table 1:39 amid Chart
72, leaves no doubt that duringtimes of panic, or at least when
great stresses prevailed, activetransmission of theSüflCtype of
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eventsoccurred. In other words sharp falls in Fces of securities
had a tendency tosprearl from one Country to another. The move-
ment tooklittle time, occasionally Only no more than a few days
orweeks. The various stockmarkets represented therefore a rather
homogeneous set of economic activities.They were interconnected
so thatthey could affect each other if the system wasdisturbed in
a mannerthat has never been fully described. The present survey
too offersonly scant hints as to the nature of the investigationsthat
would have to becarried out. There are good reasons to assume
that a descriptionwhich would satisfy scientific standardswhich
we mustadhere to in the future can neverbe given for the past,
because of the lossand scarcity of the sources, andof the lack
of contemporary,truly scientific observation.
Section 4. Foreign CapitalFlotations
(13) Domestic andforeign influences meet onthe security mar-
kets in perhapstheir most importantform through the flotationof
capital issues.Capital is offeredand demanded from both sources
and for both purposes.It would thereforebe of primary importance
to collectand interpret the necessarystatistics and to comparethe
findings with theinterest rates,exchange rates, and the restof the
data. A greatdeal of labor hasindeed been spent inthe course of
this work, and manyseries weregathered, examined,and rejected.
The hope thatultimately a condensedreport could begiven came
to naught.There are two reasons:
The field is solarge that only athorough descriptionwith
a presentationof the properbackground couldhave any value.
Space forbids thisundertaking in thepresent work,which is already
voluminous.
Even theexploration of thefield actuallyundertaken has
shown conclusivelythat the materialdoes not yieldthe infonna-
tion required.Not only arethe datafrequently ofhighly doubtful
value, but they arealso actuallylacking or purelyimaginary for
some countries.Where they doexist, as forEngland before1914 or
for the UnitedStates after1935, they giveaggregativeinformation
which does not answerour questions.The maintroubles arethe
samepreviouslyencountered: wehave figuresof specious accuracy
which stand insplendid isolationin a vastfield aboutwhich other-
wise only thevaguest kindof informationexists. Thestatistics of
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different countries cannot be fitted together. Greatgaps and gulfs
separate them fromeach other and from the figuresothcrw
avatlal)lc.
In that respect it is the same as with the foreignSecurities. Ev
if we knew how much capitalwa floated at a s1)ecified timein
London for the United States, we do not know whenthe Purchases
of what materials were macic, who bought thenew issues, i.e., ca1j.
tal from what countries in London, in Wh(lt shares,at what rate the
proceeds of the issue were used, in which country,etc..-aIl questions
about which much ought to be knownto give the figuresmcallinu
in regard to the description of the phenomenonof the transmiss1o0
of effects and economic conditions.Completeness in thesematters is obviously unattainable, buta am in imal s(rtict iirc of informt,jj,j
is needed which cannot be estal)lishedat present. Presumal)Jvit vihl never be possible toreconstruct for the past; it might l)C1)05- sible to build up such patterns for thefuture.
It is thus the magnitude of the task whichkeeps us from attack.
ing this problem. Other writers havedone valuable workin de-
scribing capital issues, and it is froma basic reconsideration of their
attempts that a new start would haveto be made. Besides the much
neglected point of the patternof information in thesewritings, it would also benecessary to bring the even more neglectedcon-
siderations about theaccuracy of economic informal ion to the fore-
ground.
The l)reviously used statisticsof interest rates, exchangerates,
and their various derivatives,together with stock priecs, had the
advantage of being symbols ofvast transactions. It would in each
case have been better to know thetransactions themselves, i.e., the
magnitude of the short-term andlong-terni capital flows, their
origins and directions, the stockmarket transfers fromone coun-
try to another. These "symbols"were only a substitute and their
study made it virtuallyimpossible, save by indirectargument, to
establish anything about theinteraction of the different national
economic spheres. In the field of foreigncapital flotations not even
such symbols arc available.This then is the finalreason why we do
not choose to push theinvestigation further in this directionat the
present juncture.:6 These remarksmake italso clear why the
balance of paymentsapproach is not followedup in this investiga-
tion. As can be surmised, theargument applied to that case is almost
identical.
The extensive material collectedmay be published at another time.
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DESCRIPTION OF SHARE PRICE INDEXES OF
THE UNiTED STATES, GREAT BRiTAiN,
GERMANY, AND FRANCE
United States.The Cowles Commission Index' of all common
stocks, which isavailable from 1871, was used in this case. Although
the totalnumber of stocks included varies over the period 1871-
1938, yet allindustrial and public utility common stocks and about
93 per cent inmarket value of the railroad stocks traded on the
New YorkStock Exchange were taken up in the indexfor the
period 1871-1917.Subsequent to 1917, about 96 per cent of the
market value ofstocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange
which are "sufficientlyactive" for regular sales were taken up in
the index. After1924 important stocks traded onthe New York
Curb Exchangeand a few other stock exchanges werealso in-
cluded.
The figures "are'spliced' to monthly averagesof the weekly
Standard Statisticsindexes which begin in1918 or later, with
1926 = 100, so thatthe figures currentlypublished by the latter
organization may beused without adjustmentin bringing up todate
the various indexesin this series. Theprice relative foreach issue
in an index receives aweight equal to theproduct of the price
per shareby the numberof shares outstanding.All necessary ad-
justments havebeen made forchanges in thenumber of shares
outstanding."2
The index3 wasrevised for theperiod after 1917,and the base
1935-1939 = 100 wasadopted.
Great Britain.The Londonand CambridgeEconomic Service4
has computed anindex including 26to 80 stocks,with base middle
of 1800 = 100, for theperiod 1867-1914.No weights wereassigned.
The "KitchinIndex"5 for 20unweighted industh,base 1913 =
2jIifrd Cowles, 3rd, andAssociates,commonSt0Ck Indexes,1811-1937,
Principia Press, 1938, pp.66-61.
5lbid. P Price IndexRecord,
'Standard and Poor'sCorporation. LongTermSecurity
pp. 5-6.
'Royal Economic Society.
MernorandU1 No.47, June1934, "AnIndex
Number of Securities
186'7-1914," by K. C.Smith and G. F.Home.
London and Cambridge
Economic ServiCe,1923 and if.
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100, is available for the period 1919-1924. The relative irnportaii
assigned to difkreiit ifl(llistries WaS haSe(l On the results of tl1
1907 Census of Production.
A. L. Buwlcy, C. L. Scliw..trtz, and K. C. SniitIi' ct1cUlak'(l aver-
ages for about 90 British industrial shares, grouped into 14 classes
l)ase 1924 = 100, for the period after 1924. Within each class the
relatives were weighted according to 1SSLIC(I capital. The groups
were again weighted in accordance with the relative importance
of net output of industries in 1924. l)ue regard was given to changes
in the nature of the security, e.g., splitting of shares, bOnuSes, rights,
etc.
Germany.The Institut für Konjunkturforschting7 ptillislied three
separate indexes of stock prices for Germany covering the pt'riods:
(a) 1870-1899, (b) 1890-1913, (c) 1924-1935. As to (a): for this
period the index is an unwi'ightcd index of representative stocks,
base 1913 = 100. As to (h): for 1890-1913 the base 1913 = 1(X)
was retained, 1)ut the shares were weighted in accordance with
the normnal capital. As to (c) :actually the Statistiches lleiehsamt
is responsible for the computation of the share 1)rice index for the
period 1924-1935. However the same shares were included in the
index (about 300), and the method (if weighting also corresponds
to that described above. The base was shifted to 1924-1926 = 100.
France. Jean Déssirieris responsible for the calculation of a
monthly unweighted average of French share prices for the period
1898-1938, base 1913 = 100. Price quotations near the end of the
month were used.
A general index was corn1)uted from a series of indexes covering
short periods of time and a varying number of securities. From
1898 to July 1900, 17 securities were included, and in 1914 the
number included was 25.
This general index was compared by the National Bureau of
Economic Research with the annual index of 54 security prices
published in the Journal (IChi Société tic Statistique de Parisin
May 1928. Since the movements were very similar, and on account
of the fact that the latter seriesis comprehensive, the former
series was adjusted slightly to equate its annual averages to that
of the annual series.
Royal Economic Society, ,frniorim!um Ne. 28, F'ehriiary 1931.
Vierk'lja1irhefte zur Ken junki urforseh ung, Sender/u-ft 38, 1934,pp. 98-99,
and issues of Wirtsclaaft und Statistik after this (late.
Indices Généraux thi Mourement Econo,nh1ucn France de 1901 ñ 1931,
pp. 126, 159, and succe'sive iSSLIeS of Bulletin dc hi Statist ique Gtnérale'.
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For 1919-1925 securities in25 groups, taken up in the index,
wereincluded with base 1901-1910100. The base was then con-
yerted to 1913 = 100. Fromthe beginning of 1926a new index
wascalculated from the base 1925 = 100,and January 1926 of
this new index wasthen equated to the above-mentioned index
with base 1913 = 100.From January 1926 the index comprised 288
securities in 20 groups,and from 1929 300 securities ingroups
These four indexes coverdifferent ground due to the differences
in the economies.All include industrial, mining, and public utility
shares. In the Americanindex railroads make up by far the most
important group; indeedthe view was often expressed that before
World War I railroad sharesalone give a correct picture of Ameri-
can stockexchange activity, and consequently indexescomposed
solely of them havefrequently been used. In other countries their
role is minor but notnegligible, as in France; in Germany they
disappear from theindex in 1889, due to the nationalizationof the
main railroads.They do not occur at all in theBritish index, al-
though railroads had not yetbeen nationalized.
The situation regardingrailroad shares illustrates a typicaldiffi-
culty: their exclusionfrom the American andFrench indexes would
certainly violate the picture,since these sharesfigured very promi-
nently in both countriesand the statisticalequivalence obtained
by the indexeswould not be an economic one.On the other hand
no Germanraikoiid shares existedafter 1889;b0 thestate-owned
railroads themselveshad not disappearedbut rendered services
to the German economynot much differentfrom that given by
the American ones tothe American economy.So in no way is it
possible to obtainformal statisticalequivalence and theindexes
have to be taken asthey are. Instead wemust assume thatthey
correctly describe thehappenings at therespective stockmarkets
and that it should be ourtask to compareand correlate thesede-
scriptions, ratherthan to insist uponidentical instrumentsfor
description. Similardifficulties arisewith other components:banks
are included inthe three Europcaflindexes, butexcluded in the
American. The Germanindex even containsshares of threemort-
gage banks,whose activities arenot likely toreflect easily inter-
n-' Lt1OflL 1IIUU"
'The reason beingthat, as the indexmoves awayfrom the baseperiod dif-
ferent stocks begin tobe weighteddifferently Ofl accountof divergingprice
trends.
"Excepting those of afew secondaTYrailroads.
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We summarize our position therefore as follows:our first Step
was flu)st naturally to examine the covariation of thosestuck Price
indexes which, in their respective countries.are consideredas bc
reflecting stock market activity. Therefore (lie indexeshave to be
taken as they are; we cannot consider it as our taskto improupon them. We were however able to point out certaindeficien(.jes
going in two directions (inSO1flCcases): (a) that they donot
give a complete enough picture even of the purely domestic
aspects of stock market activity, and (h) that theyare only of restrjct
value for tracing international influences; time latter factis particti.
larly serious, if (a) is also true (as is thecase notably for the
United States). When such conditions obtain,it is quite ('lear that
we cannot expect that the figures of the indexesare convenient
summaries of the conditions they are supposed torepresent.
TABLE 141
Groups Covered by Four Stock Price Indexesa
a "Yes" indicates that thegroup is not excluded by definition. It does notmean that stocks of that group have actually beenused in the compilation of the index for theentircperiod covered by the respective indexes.
Table 141 indicates thegroups covered by the four stock price
indexes; the table has to beinterpreted in the sense that shares of
the respective fields ofeconomic activities have, atone time or
another, been included in thecomposition of the indexes. This was
not always the case from the beginningand during the entire period
for which theyare available. If the groupswere broken down still
further this would becomequite clear: in the Britishindex, for
example, electrical companiesare included unIv since 1900; e'i-
(lently there wereno such companies before that time considered
tobe sufficiently important.The same applies to other countries
and also to other industriesor services.
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The number of stocks in each group also underwent considerable
changes. Inthe British index, for example, the total increases from
28 in 1870 to180 in 1910; there was a rise in all categories except
transportation stocks. Afull presentation of these matters will
hardly contribute tothe diSCUSSiOfl in the chapter above.
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